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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Pursuant to Rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, the District Court certified as final the 
orders appealed from. Appellate jurisdiction is 
conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to 
Rule 5(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and 
Utah Code § 78A-4-103. 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
1. In August 2 006, Lorin and Dianne Leavitt 
("Leavitts") contracted with GDE Construction, Inc. 
("GDE") to perform certain remodeling work on their 
home and property. (R4 05; First Amended Verified 
Complaint, 2) 
2. The terms of the agreement were that the 
Leavitts would pay GDE on a cost plus basis, paying for 
GDE's costs and 15% for profit and overhead. (R405) 
3. The Leavitts contend that the 15% included 
labor to be performed by GDE. (R4 05) GDE contends that 
labor was to be billed separately. (R560) 
4. GDE began work on the project in October 2006. 
(R1084) 
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5. By the beginning of 2007, the Leavitts had 
requested substantially more work than originally 
contemplated and the cost of the project increased. 
(R1084) 
6. In February 2007, the Leavitts obtained a 
construction loan from Bank of American Fork ("BAF") in 
the amount of $1,137,000 ("First Construction Loan"). 
(R1102) 
7. As a condition of approving the loan, BAF 
required that GDE sign as guarantor a "Guaranty of 
Completion and Performance" dated February 9, 2007. 
GDE signed the guaranty. (R1102) 
8. BAF approved the First Construction Loan and 
disbursed the loan proceeds to GDE, as requested, 
during the next several months. (R1102) 
9. Between February and October 2007, the cost 
and scope of the project increased again, and the 
proceeds from the First Construction Loan ran out. 
(R1084) 
10. In or about October 2007, Lorin Leavitt met 
with GDE's principals, Don and Amy Eldredge to discuss 
the status of the project and how to proceed. (R1084) 
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15. In its First Lien GDE claims it ufurnished the 
first labor, materials and/or equipment on October 10, 
2006 and furnished the last labor, materials and/or 
equipment on April 30, 2008." (R1084) 
16. After GDE recorded the First Lien, the 
Leavitts informed. GDE that the lien was preventing them 
from obtaining permanent financing on the property. As 
evidence of this fact, the Leavitts presented GDE with 
a letter from CityWide Home Loans indicating that the 
lien was preventing them from obtaining permanent 
financing. (R2029) 
17. Four days after the Leavitts informed GDE that 
the First Lien was preventing them from obtaining 
permanent financing, GDE presented the Leavitts with a 
"Promissory Note with Confession of Judgment (Secured 
by Trust Deed against Real Property)" ("GDE Note"). 
(R1084) The GDE Note was secured by a trust deed 
recorded against certain property owned by the 
Leavitts, however, GDE's trust deed was superseded by 
previously-recorded interests on that property such 
that the property had no equity with which to pay GDE's 
trust deed. (R2025) 
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23. GDE did not perform any new work on the 
Project from the time of recording of the First Lien to 
the time of recording the Second Lien. (R1102) 
24 . The Leavitts and BAF contend that Amy Eldredge 
recorded the Second Lien on the Leavitt home because 
the GDE Note, secured by the GDE Trust Deed, was not 
paid. (R1102) 
25. GDE contends that it recorded the Second Lien 
because no payment was made toward the balance due to 
GDE for the work performed on the project. (R2029) 
26. On July 16, 2 008, GDE further recorded on the 
Leavitt home an "Amended Lien to Suupercede [sic] Lien 
Recorded on June 25, 2 008, Utah County Recorder Number 
73098:2008" in the principal amount of $563,690.45 
("Amended Lien"). GDE amended the lien to include the 
total amount due on the project, including amounts owed 
to subcontractors. Some of the subcontractors asserted 
claims for breach of contract against GDE, and GDE 
disclaimed any obligation to pay those subcontractors 
in those respective actions. (R1102) 
27. On August 18, 2008, a Notice of Default and 
Election to Sell ("Notice of Default") for the GDE 
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Trust Deed was recorded on the St. George Property. 
(R560) 
28. Also on August 18, 2008, GDE filed the instant 
action naming Ms. Leavitt, BAF and other lien claimants 
as defendants. (R12) 
29. In its First Amended Complaint filed November 
6, 2008 ("Amended Complaint"), GDE brought claims for, 
as against Mrs. Leavitt, (1) breach of contract, (2) 
quantum meruit/contract implied in fact, (3) quantum 
meruit/contract implied in law, each in the total 
principal amount of $563,690.23, and, as against all 
parties, (4) to foreclose its Amended Lien, with a 
deficiency judgment as against Mrs. Leavitt for any 
resulting deficiency following foreclosure of its 
Amended Lien. (R2 0) 
30. The Leavitts filed a counterclaim, and 
additionally sought a temporary restraining order 
preventing GDE from proceeding to foreclosure on the 
property secured by the GDE Note on the basis that it 
was fraudulently entered into and enforced. (R104, 
R359, R405) 
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31. The parties conducted discovery, including 
taking the depositions of the principals of GDE and the 
Leavitts. 
32. After discovery closed, the Leavitts filed a 
motion for summary judgment asserting that the GDE Note 
constituted an accord and satisfaction and that GDE's 
claims must be dismissed and requesting 54(b) 
certification of whatever order the trial court 
entered. (R1084) 
33. BAF also filed a motion for summary judgment, 
duplicating many of Leavitts arguments, and 
additionally asserting that the Guaranties require GDE 
to release its lien claims and settle the other lien 
claims on the project. (R1102) 
34. GDE opposed the Leavitts' motion on several 
bases: 1) that the GDE Note was void under the doctrine 
of mutual mistake because both parties believed that 
release of the lien would lead to permanent financing, 
and it did not; 2) that there was no accord and 
satisfaction; and 3) that the release of the First Lien 
was invalid because no payment was made. (R2025) GDE 
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submitted a declaration of Amy Eldredge in opposition 
to the motion. (R2029) 
35. GDE opposed BAF's motion, reiterating its 
defenses from its opposition to the Leavitts' motion, 
and also asserting that the Guaranties are 
unenforceable under Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute. 
(Utah Code § 38-1-1, et seq.) (R1929) 
36. BAF and the Leavitts filed motions to strike 
the affirmative defense of mutual mistake as it was not 
adequately pled and to strike the Declaration of Amy 
Eldredge, arguing that paragraph 5 of the Declaration 
contradicted her prior deposition testimony and relied 
on inadmissible hearsay within hearsay. (R 2059, 2126) 
The offending statement is, "I was told by the Leavitts 
that the only condition precedent to the granting of a 
loan by Citywide Home Loans was the release of the 
First Lien." (R2029) 
37. GDE opposed the motion to strike the 
affirmative defense, relying on the following language 
from GDE's answer to the Leavitt's Amended Verified 
Complaint: "GDE specifically pleads the defenses of 
estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud, illegality, 
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laches, license, payment, release, statute of frauds, 
and any other matter constituting an avoidance or 
affirmative defense as may be disclosed through 
discovery." (Emphasis added.) Alternatively, GDE 
requested that it be granted leave to amend its answer 
under Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Finally, GDE opposed the motion to strike the 
Declaration of Amy Eldredge, arguing that there was no 
inconsistency and that the testimony did not rely on 
hearsay within hearsay. (R2166, 2181) 
38. After the parties fully briefed the motions, 
the Court held oral argument which substantially 
followed the briefing. On October 26, 2010, the Court 
issued a written ruling granting in part the motions to 
strike and granting BAF and the Leavitts' motions for 
summary judgment. (R2230) The ruling was later reduced 
to two written orders to which GDE objected, and BAF 
and the Leavitts replied. (R2288, 2285, 2305, 2344) 
These orders contained language certifying them as 
final under Rule 54(b). (R2321, 2391) BAF did not 
object to these orders. 
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39. The Order on the motions to strike was entered 
on November 29, 2 010, and the Order on the motions for 
summary judgment was entered on December 9, 2010. 
(2321, 2391) 
40. GDE filed a request for reconsideration or 
clarification on November 26, 2010, which was fully 
briefed. (R2313) The Court denied GDE's request for 
reconsideration on January 4, 2011. (R2471) 
41. BAF, the Leavitts, and a subcontractor who had 
entered into a settlement agreement with GDE (Noorda 
Architectural Metals, Inc.) immediately began 
collection and enforcement actions against GDE. 
42. On January 28, 2011, GDE filed a motion to set 
aside the judgments, request for 54(b) certification, 
and for an extension of time to file a notice of 
appeal. (R2534) 
43. On February 1, 2011, GDE filed a notice of 
appeal. (R2577) 
44. On February 7, 2011, before the parties had 
fully briefed GDE's motion, the Court granted GDE's 
request for 54 (b) certification and for an extension of 
time to file a notice of appeal. (R2624) 
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45. Collection actions proceeded before the 
District Court until March 15, 2011, when Judge Hansen 
ordered a stay of all proceedings pending the outcome 
of the appeal. (R3341) 
46. BAF filed a motion for summary disposition of 
this appeal, arguing that: 1) the notice of appeal was 
untimely; 2) that GDE's docketing statement was 
deficient; and 3) that the orders appealed from were 
improperly certified under Rule 54 (b) . In an Order 
filed April 26, 2011, this Court denied BAF's motion as 
to the first two grounds on the merits, and deferred 
consideration of the certification issue. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
I. Jurisdiction 
BAF argues that these Orders were improperly 
certified under Rule 54 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The proposed orders submitted jointly by 
BAF and the Leavitts included language certifying them 
as final under Rule 54(b), and BAF did not object at 
that time and has waived that argument. 
However, in the event this Court reaches the 
merits of that issue, GDE asserts that the three 
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elements required for proper interlocutory 
certification are met: 1) there must be multiple claims 
for relief or multiple parties to the action; 2) the 
decision would be final as to the claim on which it is 
rendered; and 3) there is no just reason for delay. 
Here, all three elements are met: there are at least 
three remaining parties in this litigation; the 
decisions rendered by the Court fully dispose of the 
claims on which they were rendered; and there is no 
just reason for delay. Indeed, BAF itself seems to 
believe that the Order is final, as it has begun 
collection actions against GDE, which could not be 
commenced absent a final order. 
II. Motions to Strike 
A. Paragraph 5 of the Eldredge Declaration is 
admissible. 
The trial court struck Paragraph 5 on the basis 
that it contains hearsay within hearsay. However, 
first level of hearsay - the statement by CityWide - is 
not being offered for the truth of the matter, but only 
for the effect on the listener. The second level of 
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hearsay - the statement by the Leavitts - is a party 
admission under Rule 801(d)(2). 
B. The affirmative defense of mutual mistake was 
adequately pled. Alternatively, the trial 
court erred in failing to grant GDE leave to 
amend its answer to include mutual mistake. 
GDE's catchall statement adequately incorporated 
mutual mistake. Alternatively, because the trial had 
not commenced, and because the assertion of the defense 
of mutual mistake would not have necessitated 
additional discovery, the trial court erred in failing 
to grant GDE leave to amend its complaint, either 
expressly or impliedly by consent of the parties. 
III. The parties did not reach an accord and 
satisfaction. 
The three elements of accord and satisfaction are: 
1) the amount is unliquidated and disputed; 2) payment 
is made on the amount; 3) that the creditor accept 
payment as satisfaction of the debt. In this case, 
none of the three elements are met. First, GDE alleged 
that the amount was undisputed, as discussed by the 
parties during the October meeting. Second, the 
promissory note was never intended by the parties to be 
payment of any kind as evidenced by the lack of a 
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$10,000 down payment and no collection under the note. 
Furthermore, the note could not serve as payment unless 
honored. Third, GDE never accepted the note as payment 
in full. 
IV. The Guaranties of Completion are unenforceable 
under Utah's Mechanic's Lien Statute. 
The First Guaranty of Completion was executed in 
February 2 007, before the enactment of § 38-1-39, and 
is thus expressly invalid and contrary to Utah's 
Mechanic's lien law (See § 38-1-29) as held by this 
Court in Olsen v. Chase, 2011 UT App 181. 
The Second Guaranty of Completion, executed in 
December 2007, is also invalid as it runs afoul of the 
above-stated provision forbidding any private attempts 
to change the nature of lien rights except as expressly 
provided for in the Code. Additionally, it fails to 
comply with the requirements of Utah Code § 38-1-39, 
which requires that all lien releases and waivers 
conform to a certain format and be founded upon payment 
of the amount due. Because GDE did not receive payment 
for its execution of the Second Guaranty, nor does it 
comply with the form required by Section 39, the Second 
Guaranty is unenforceable. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The question of 54(b) certification is a 
jurisdictional question that is reviewed by this Court 
at its own discretion. Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 
2002 UT 6, H 18, 44 P.3d 663. The issue of proper 
certification is a question of law reviewed for 
correctness. Kennecott Corp. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 
814 P.2d 1099, 1100 (Utah 1991) . 
Because this matter comes before the Court on 
competing motions for summary judgment, all factual 
inferences are taken in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party - Appellant GDE. uAn appellate court 
reviews a trial court's legal conclusions and ultimate 
grant or denial of summary judgment for correctness and 
views the facts and all reasonable inferences drawn 
therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party." Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 2, 1 6, 177 P.3d 
600. 
ARGUMENT 
GDE argues that jurisdiction is proper in this 
Court as the Orders were properly certified and BAF 
waived any argument in opposition to their 
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certification by failing to file any objection to the 
Orders. 
On the merits, GDE appeals three issues: 1) 
whether the trial court properly struck the defense of 
mutual mistake and portions of the Declaration of Amy 
Eldredge; 2) whether the trial court properly found 
that there was an accord and satisfaction between the 
Leavitts and GDE; and 3) whether the trial court 
properly ruled that the First and Second Guaranties are 
enforceable against GDE. 
I. THE ORDERS APPEALED FROM ARE PROPERLY BEFORE 
THIS COURT. 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear all appeals 
from final orders. This jurisdiction extends to orders 
that are certified as final under Rule 54 (b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. For 54(b) certification 
to be proper, only three elements need be met: 1) there 
must be multiple claims for relief or multiple parties 
to the action; 2) the decision would be final as to the 
claim on which it is rendered; and 3) there is no just 
reason for delay. Powell v. Cannon, 179 P.3d 799, 807 
(Utah 2008). 
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Here, all three requirements are met. The claims 
which are the subject of this appeal are the Leavitt's 
defense to all of GDE's claims on the basis of accord 
and satisfaction (the trial court dismissed GDE's 
complaint as a result), BAF's breach of contract claim 
under the guaranty (which was granted in its entirety), 
and the subsequent awards of attorneys' fees as a 
result of the previous orders. These orders fully 
dispose of the various claims to which they pertain, 
leaving the remainder of the case intact. This matter 
is ripe for appeal. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE MOTIONS 
TO STRIKE THE DEFENSE OF MUTUAL MISTAKE AND 
THE DECLARATION OF AMY ELDREDGE. 
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING PARAGRAPH 5 
OF THE ELDREDGE DECLARATION. 
In response to BAF and the Leavitts' motions for 
summary judgment, GDE filed an opposition that included 
a declaration of Amy Eldredge, a principal of GDE. In 
the declaration, Amy sought to clarify what the 
Leavitts had argued regarding the effect of the 
CityWide letter. Amy stated: "I was told by the 
Leavitts that the only condition precedent to the 
22 
granting of a loan by Citywide Home Loans was the 
release of the First Lien." 
BAF and the Leavitts filed motions to strike this 
statement on the basis that it contained hearsay within 
hearsay and was inadmissible. The consideration of 
evidentiary objections is a matter left to the 
discretion of the trial court. Here, the trial court 
improperly granted the motion. Rule 8 05 of the Utah 
Rules of Evidence forbids the use of hearsay within 
hearsay. To be admissible, a statement must either not 
be hearsay or fall into one of the exceptions of the 
hearsay rule. 
The first level of hearsay here is the statement 
by CityWide to the Leavitts that the lien was a bar to 
permanent financing. This statement is not being 
offered for the truth of the matter - to wit, whether 
the CityWide would actually fund the loan if the lien 
was released, but rather, for the effect on the 
listener, i.e. whether or not the Leavitts and GDE 
believed that CityWide would fund the loan if the lien 
was removed. Whether or not CityWide would actually 
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comply with the letter is immaterial for hearsay 
purposes. 
The second level of hearsay is the statement by 
the Leavitts to GDE, restating the CityWide letter. 
However, the statement is not hearsay. Rule 801(d)(2) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that a statement 
is not hearsay if: "the statement is offered against a 
party and is (A) the party's own statement../7 Because 
the Leavitts are a party and it is their own statement, 
it is not hearsay and the trial court erred in ruling 
that it was. Accordingly, GDE respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse the trial court's ruling and 
order that the statement be admitted into the record. 
B, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN STRIKING THE DEFENSE 
OF MUTUAL MISTAKE. 
In both its Verified Answer and its Answer to the 
First Amended Complaint of Lorin and Dianne Leavitt, 
GDE included the following language, "GDE specifically 
pleads the defenses of estoppel, failure of 
consideration, fraud, illegality, laches, license, 
payment, release, statute of frauds, and any other 
matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense 
as may be disclosed through discovery." As discovery 
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progressed, GDE was able to piece together the evidence 
showing that the parties believed that the long-term 
financing would go through and pay GDE's general 
contractor fee. These facts were established through 
the various depositions, including the depositions of 
Don and Amy Eldredge which were conducted near the 
close of discovery. Now that the facts supporting 
GDE's mutual mistake argument have been developed, 
GDE's "catchall" defense is triggered, including mutual 
mistake. Additionally, GDE is entitled to amend its 
pleadings to include the affirmative defense of mutual 
mistake. Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
states: 
When issues not raised by the pleadings are 
tried by express or implied consent of the 
parties, they shall be treated in all respects 
as if they had been raised in the pleadings. 
Such amendments of the pleadings as may be 
necessary to cause them to conform to the 
evidence and to raise these issues may be made 
upon motion of any party at any time, even 
after judgment; but failure to so amend does 
not affect the result of the trial of these 
issues. 
Rule 15 has been interpreted to include the affirmative 
defense of mutual mistake of fact. Opposing counsel 
correctly cites Mabey v. Kay Peterson Const. Co., Inc., 
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682 P.2d 287 (1984) in support of the Leavitts' 
position that mutual mistake must be affirmatively 
pled. However, as the court points out when discussing 
mutual mistake in. Mabey, "It is true that when issues 
not raised by the pleadings are tried by express or 
implied consent they shall be treated in all respects 
as if they had been raised in the pleadings." Id. at 
289. Accordingly, to the extent necessary, GDE 
affirmatively requests that the Court grant leave to 
amend its pleadings to include the affirmative defense 
of mutual mistake. 
There is ample cause in this case to allow the 
amendment. The Leavitts' argument that the promissory 
note constituted an accord and satisfaction had not 
been previously raised. Accordingly, GDE could not 
have anticipated this argument (at least in the form 
appearing in their motion for summary judgment), and 
thus GDE should be allowed to raise the affirmative 
defense of mutual mistake. Furthermore, there is no 
prejudice to the Leavitts. The facts surrounding 
mutual mistake have already been developed and there is 
no need for further discovery. GDE respectfully 
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requests that this Court reverse the trial court's 
decision to strike the defense of mutual mistake and 
allow the issue to go to trial. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT GDE'S 
CLAIM WAS SATISFIED BY AN ACCORD AND 
SATISFACTION. 
The elements of accord and satisfaction are: 1) 
that the amount is unliquidated and disputed; 2) that 
payment is made in satisfaction of the debt; and 3) 
that the creditor accept the payment as full 
satisfaction. Smith v. Grand Canyon Expeditions Co., 
84 P.3d 1154, 1158 (Utah 2003). However, the 
undisputed facts of this case show that none of the 
three elements were met. 
The amount at issue here is liquidated and 
undisputed. The dispute, to the extent there was on at 
the time of execuition of the Promissory Note and Trust 
Deedk, involved how the payment to the subcontractors 
would be made. Leavitts felt it necessary to have GDE 
release its lien so they could pay the amount owing on 
the project. The GDE Note served only to facilitate 
permanent financing and was never meant to be payment. 
If the Leavitts had paid the amount stated in the note, 
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which corresponded with the amount stated in GDE's 
First Lien, then the lien would have been released and 
no further action would have been required. 
Additionally, because the Leavitts never paid the down 
payment of $10,000, and because they never paid 
anything else under the Note, it is clear from the 
evidence that it was never meant to be enforceable. 
More importantly is the fact that the Leavitts 
have expressly disclaimed any obligation to pay under 
the Note, and indeed, sought a temporary restraining 
order preventing GDE's action to foreclose. Because 
this is a motion for summary judgment, all facts must 
be taken in the light most favorable to GDE. While it 
may seem contradictory for GDE to rely on a fact that a 
note it holds may not be enforceable, that is the 
conclusion that must be drawn by this judge overseeing 
this case in this court. Because the Leavitts disclaim 
any obligation to pay under the Note, claiming that it 
was fraudulently entered into, then the trial court 
should have concluded that the Note is unenforceable 
and that GDE's version of the facts is correct: the 
Note was never intended to be payment and thus could 
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not have release GDE's mechanic's lien and contract 
claims. 
IV. THE GUARANTIES OF COMPLETION ARE UNENFORCEABLE 
UNDER UTAH'S MECHANICS LIEN STATUTE. 
BAF's main argument is that GDE is bound by the 
two documents entitled "Guaranty of Completion and 
Performance" which were signed by GDE contemporaneously 
with BAF's approval of the Leavitts' two construction 
loans. In its motion, BAF seeks to enforce the 
indemnification and subordination language of the 
Guaranty, which is as follows: 
GUARANTY: Guarantor hereby unconditionally and 
absolutely warrants and guarantees to Lender 
that:... (c) except for Lender's security 
agreements, the Project will be constructed 
and completed free and clear of all liens and 
encumbrances, including without limitation all 
mechanics' liens, materialman's liens and 
equitable liens; ... 
BAF seeks enforcement of this provision through 
specific performance as well as an award of attorneys' 
fees associated with this action. 
A. CURRENT UTAH LAW REQUIRES THAT SUBORDINATION 
AGREEMENTS BE ACCOMPANIED BY PAYMENT TO BE ENFORCEABLE. 
After the trial court ruled on this motion, and 
before this brief was drafted, this Court issued its 
decision in Olsen v. Chase, 2011 UT App 181. In Olsen, 
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this Court held that subordination agreements executed 
prior to March 31, 2007 (the effective date of Utah 
Code § 38-1-39) are prohibited by statute and 
unenforceable. Id. at H 14. This Court did not rule 
on what requirements must be met for a subordination 
agreement to be valid if executed after that date.1 GDE 
maintains that such agreements must comply with the 
express requirements of Section 39, including requiring 
that any change in lien rights be accompanied by 
payment for service rendered. 
BAF cites to the Utah Court of Appeals' decision 
in Ellsworth Paulsen Construction Co. V. 51-SPR, LLC, 
144 P.3d 261 (Ut. Ct. App. 2006), aff'd, 183 P.3d 248 
(Utah 2008) . In Ellsworth, a property owner contracted 
with a general contractor to build two office 
buildings. The property owner entered into a separate 
agreement with an investor to obtain financing for the 
1 GDE notes that the Utah State Legislature in the 
Spring 2 011 General Session passed a number of changes 
to the Mechanic's Lien law, including a provision that 
brings the statute in harmony with this Court's ruling 
in Olsen and GDE's interpretation of the statute. The 
new changes (Utah Code § 38-1-1, et seq. 2011) now 
expressly provide that a construction lender must buy 
out the priority of a senior lienholder in order to 
maintain a lien right. 
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project. At intervals during the project, general 
contractor would submit invoices to the lender for 
payment. The lender would then pay those invoices when 
the general contractor signed an attached waiver of 
lien and indemnification which contains language which 
is substantially similar to the language of the 
Guaranty at issue in this case. At some point during 
the project, the property owner began diverting funds 
away from the project and began to get behind in paying 
the general contractor. Despite not being paid, the 
general contractor continued working for some time 
until the owner disappeared. At that point, the 
general contractor learned of the involvement of the 
investor and sought payment directly from them. The 
investor refused payment and the general contractor 
filed a lien against the project and sought 
foreclosure. 
The investor asserted the defense of waiver of 
lien and indemnification against claims made by 
subcontractors (which had been paid separately by 
investor) based on the various agreements signed by the 
general contractor as it was paid. The trial court 
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ruled that the lien waivers were valid, but refused to 
apply the guaranty and indemnification language. Both 
parties appealed.2 
The Court of Appeals held that the lien waivers 
were valid and enforceable, finding that when the 
general contractor signed the waivers, it was agreeing 
to the express guaranty language included in those 
agreements. The Court stated, "Likewise, when the 
guaranty and warranty language of the lien waiver 
provisions is properly construed in the context of the 
lien waiver agreement, those provisions are valid and 
enforceable." Id. at 273 (emphasis added). 
It is clear from this ruling that a guaranty and 
warranty provision is only enforceable if it is given 
in conjunction with payment. ("Here, as part of the 
valid lien waiver provisions, the applicability of the 
indemnity and guaranty language hinges on the relevant 
draw dates for each check, as is so with the specific 
lien waiver language itself." Id. at 273.) Thus, if 
the general contractor has not been paid, then it 
2There were several other issues in the case 
including joint venture which are not relevant to this 
argument. 
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cannot be bound to indemnify the lender against non-
payment to other parties. 
This holding is in perfect harmony with Utah's 
mechanic's lien statute. The statute, which is to be 
construed so as to protect the contractor's right to 
lien {Bailey v. Call, 767 P.2d 138, 140 (Utah App. 
1989)), clearly states that a lien waiver cannot be 
enforced unless it is given after the lien right has 
arisen and in conjunction with payment of the amount 
waived or released. See U.C.A. § 38-1-39. 
BAF would have this Court hold the opposite, that 
a contractor can be bound to pay its subcontractors or 
even other materialman with whom it has no contract, 
even if the general contractor has not been paid by the 
owner. This result is contrary to the longstanding 
practice of obtaining lien waivers in conjunction with 
progress payments which has been upheld by the courts 
and codified by the state legislature. 
Here, it is undisputed that GDE has not been paid 
any money for the amounts claimed by the various other 
lienholders, nor has any party contended that GDE has 
retained funds paid to it which should have been 
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disbursed to its subcontractors or any entity who 
performed work on the project. Therefore, GDE cannot 
be bound by the language of the guaranty until it has 
been paid. BAF's action to enforce the guaranty is 
premature and should not be sustained. 
B. THE GUARANTY OF COMPLETION AND PERFORMANCE IS 
NOT BINDING ON GDE. 
In addition to the reasons stated above, the 
Guaranty cannot be enforced against GDE at this point 
because it fails to meet even the most basic contract 
principles. Foremost among these, is the lack of 
consideration between the parties. In the cases cited 
by BAF, the extension of credit is sufficient 
consideration for the guaranty agreements to be 
enforceable. However, as explained above, in each of 
those cases, the guarantor was a principal of the 
borrower. In this case, GDE has no relationship with 
the Leavitts beyond the construction contract. If for 
some reason the Leavitts fail to pay on the 
construction contract, GDE still has a right to 
recovery against the Leavitts. In the cases described 
above, an investor has no right to recovery against his 
company if the company fails to turn a profit. Thus, 
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the investor only receives the benefit of the loan if 
the company succeeds. Here, GDE is entitled to be paid 
independent of whether or not that money comes from BAF 
or some other source. Thus, there is no consideration 
between BAF and GDE. 
Furthermore, the agreement is completely one-
sided. If BAF is successful, it gets the entire 
benefit of the agreement, while GDE gets nothing from 
BAF. This is made clear by the express language of the 
agreement which states, "As a condition and inducement 
to making the Loan, Borrower has requested that 
Guarantor duly execute and deliver this 
Guaranty...which [is] considered by Lender to be 
material regarding Lender's decision to make the loan." 
The benefit of the agreement flows from BAF to the 
Leavitts through BAF's decision to make the loan, but 
BAF has no obligation to pay GDE unless the Leavitts 
approve the payments. Indeed, if both the Leavitts and 
BAF are successful on their claims, BAF will have 
obtained the benefit of a lien-free project, the 
Leavitts will have obtained the benefit of GDE's work, 
and GDE will be left with the burden of paying all of 
35 
the subcontractors and other lien claimants. Such an 
outcome is contrary to principles of equity and justice 
and the trial court's decision should be reversed. 
C. THERE ARE MATERIAL DISPUTES OF FACT WHICH 
PRECLUDE GRANTING BAF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
Underlying BAF's argument in many places is the 
contention that GDE disclaims any contract with several 
of the contractors included in the Amended Lien, as 
well as the other contractor parties to this case. 
This arrangement which arises due to the nature of the 
construction industry, necessarily implicates the 
intervention of a factfinder. If GDE is correct, the 
Leavitts are responsible for payment of the amounts 
owed to those contractors. If the Leavitts and BAF are 
correct, then GDE is responsible to pay those 
subcontractors. However, BAF's argument relies on both 
versions of the facts being true: that GDE is 
responsible to pay off the other contractor liens, but 
also that GDE has no right to lien for that work. This 
paradox cannot be resolved unless there is a factual 
determination regarding the respective obligations of 
the parties, which as clearly outlined in both the 
statement of facts above and in the statement of facts 
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in GDE's response to the Leavitts' motion for summary 
judgment, are heavily disputed by the testimony of the 
parties. Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate 
at this time and the trial court's decision should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the facts and arguments set forth 
above, GDE respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the Leavitts and BAF, reverse the trial 
court's order striking the defense of mutual mistake 
and paragraph 5 of the Eldredge Declaration, and remand 
this matter for trial on the merits. 
DATED this 19th day of October, 2011. 
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P.C. 
iel\R. Widdison 
Attorney for the GDE 
Construction , Inc. 
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judgment, are heavily disputed by the testimony of the 
parties. Therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate 
at this time and the trial court's decision should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the facts and arguments set forth 
above, GDE respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment in 
favor of the Leavitts and BAF, reverse the trial 
court's order striking the defense of mutual mistake 
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Attorney for the GDE 
Construction , Inc. 
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38-1-29. No waiver of rights — Exception - Payment applied first to preconstruction service lien. 
(1) (a) A right or privilege under this chapter may not be waived or limited by contract. 
(b) A provision of a contract purporting to waive or limit a right or privilege under this chapter is void. 
(2) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), a claimant may waive or limit, in whole or in part, a lien right under this 
chapter in consideration of payment as provided in Section 38-1-39. 
(3) Unless an agreement waiving or limiting a lien right expressly provides that a payment is required to be 
applied to a specific lien, mortgage, or encumbrance, a payment to a person claiming or included within a 
preconstruction service lien and a construction service lien shall be applied first to the preconstruction service lien 
until paid in full. 
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38-1-39. Waiver or impairment of a lien right — Forms — Scope. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Check" means a payment instrument on a depository institution including: 
(i) a check; 
(ii) a draft; 
(iii) an order; or 
(iv) other instrument. 
(b) "Depository institution" is as defined in Section 7-1-103. 
(c) "Lien claimant" means a person that claims a lien under this chapter. 
(d) "Receives payment" means, in the case of a restrictive endorsement, a payee has endorsed a check and the 
check is presented to and paid by the depository' institution on which it is drawn. 
(2) Notwithstanding Section 38-1-29. a written consent given by a lien claimant that waives or limits the lien 
claimant's lien rights is enforceable only if the lien claimant: 
(a) (i) executes a waiver and release that is signed by the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent; or 
(ii) for a restrictive endorsement on a check, includes a restrictive endorsement on a check that is: 
(A) signed by the lien claimant or the lien claimant's authorized agent; and 
(B) in substantially the same form set forth in Subsection (4)(d); and 
(b) receives payment of the amount identified in the waiver and release or check that includes the restrictive 
endorsement: 
(i) including payment by a joint payee check; and 
(ii) for a progress payment, only to the extent of the payment. 
(3) (a) Notwithstanding the language of a waiver and release described in Subsection (2), Subsection (3)(b) 
applies if: 
(i) the payment given in exchange for any waiver and release of lien is made by check; and 
(ii) the check fails to clear the depository institution on which it is drawn for any reason, 
(b) If the conditions of Subsection (3)(a) are met: 
(i) the waiver and release described in Subsection (3)(a) is null, void, and of no legal effect; and 
(ii) the following will not be affected by the lien claimant's execution of the waiver and release: 
(A) any lien; 
(B) any lien right; 
(C) any bond right; 
(D) any contract right; or 
(E) any other right to recover payment afforded to the lien claimant in law or equity. 
(4) (a) A waiver and release given by a lien claimant meets the requirements of this section if it is in 
substantially the form provided in this Subsection (4) for the circumstance provided in this Subsection (4). 
(b) A waiver and release may be in substantially the following form if the lien claimant is required to execute a 
waiver and release in exchange for or to induce the payment of a progress billing: 




Invoice/Payment Application Number: 
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Payment Amount: 
Payment Period: 
To the extent provided below, this document becomes effective to release and the undersigned is considered to 
waive any notice of lien or right under Utah Code Ann., Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens, or any bond right 
under Utah Code Ann., Title 14, Contractors' Bonds, or Section 63G-6-505 related to payment rights the 
undersigned has on the above described Property once: 
(1) the undersigned endorses a check in the above referenced Payment Amount payable to the undersigned; and 
(2) the check is paid by the depository institution on which it is drawn. 
This waiver and release applies to a progress payment for the work, materials, equipment, or a combination of 
work, materials, and equipment furnished by the undersigned to the Property or to the Undersigned's Customer 
which are the subject of the Invoice or Payment Application, but only to the extent of the Payment Amount. This 
waiver and release does not apply to any retention withheld; any items, modifications, or changes pending 
approval; disputed items and claims; or items furnished or invoiced after the Payment Period. 
The undersigned warrants that the undersigned either has already paid or will use the money the undersigned 
receives from this progress payment promptly to pay in full all the undersigned's laborers, subcontractors, 
materialmen, and suppliers for all work, materials, equipment, or combination of work, materials, and equipment 





(c) A waiver and release may be in substantially the following form if the lien claimant is required to execute a 
waiver and release in exchange for or to induce the payment of a final billing: 




Invoice/Payment Application Number: 
Payment Amount: 
To the extent provided below, this document becomes effective to release and the undersigned is considered to 
waive any notice of lien or right under Utah Code Ann., Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens, or any bond right 
under Utah Code Ann., Title 14, Contractors' Bonds, or Section 63G-6-505 related to payment rights the 
undersigned has on the above described Property once: 
(1) the undersigned endorses a check in the above referenced Payment Amount payable to the undersigned; and 
(2) the check is paid by the depository institution on which it is drawn. 
This waiver and release applies to the final payment for the work, materials, equipment, or combination of 
work, materials, and equipment furnished by the undersigned to the Property or to the Undersigned's Customer. 
The undersigned warrants that the undersigned either has already paid or will use the money the undersigned 
receives from the final payment promptly to pay in full all the undersigned's laborers, subcontractors, materialmen, 
and suppliers for all work, materials, equipment, or combination of work, materials, and equipment that are the 





(d) A restrictive endorsement placed on a check to effectuate a waiver and release described in this Subsection 
(4) meets the requirements of this section if it is in substantially the following form: 
"This check is a progress/ final payment for property described on this check sufficient for identification. 
Endorsement of this check is an acknowledgment by the endorser that the waiver and release to which the payment 
applies is effective to the extent provided in Utah Code Ann. Subsection 38-l-39f4Yb) or (c) respectively." 
(e) (i) If using a restrictive endorsement under Subsection (4)(d), the person preparing the check shall indicate 
whether the check is for a progress payment or a final payment by circling the word "progress" if the check is for a 
progress payment, or the word "final" if the check is for a final payment. 
(ii) If a restrictive endorsement does not indicate whether the check is for a progress payment or a final 
payment, it is considered to be for a progress payment. 
(5) (a) If the conditions of Subsection (5)(b) are met, this section does not affect the enforcement of: 
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(i) an accord and satisfaction regarding a bona fide dispute; or 
(ii) an agreement made in settlement of an action pending in any court or arbitration, 
(b) Pursuant to Subsection (5)(a), this section does not affect enforcement of an accord and satisfaction or 
settlement described in Subsection (5)(a) if the aiccord and satisfaction or settlement: 
(i) is in a writing signed by the lien claimant; and 
(ii) specifically references the lien rights waived or impaired. 
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78A-4-103. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process 
necessary: 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals 
from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service 
Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of 
Forestry, Fire, and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural 
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63G-3-602; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those involving a conviction or charge of a first 
degree felony or capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, 
annulment, property division, child custody, support, parent-time, visitation, adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify to 
the Supreme Court for original appellate review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals 
has original appellate jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4, Administrative 
Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 
Amended by Chapter 344,2009 General Session 
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